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This study investigates the pay-performance relation for directors and managers in a sample of Thai public 
companies.   It is hypothesized that family ownership mediates the pay-performance relations for directors 
and managers.  The results show a strong link between managerial compensation and firm performance 
only for firms with low levels of family ownership.  Conversely, there is a strong link between director 
compensation and firm performance only for firms with high levels of family ownership.  The findings 
indicate that the relation between executive compensation and firm performance is more complex than 
previously documented. 
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1 Introduction 
Compensation contracts are utilized as a means of aligning the interests of agents (managers) 
with those of principals (owners) and can be designed to provide incentives aligning the 
behavior of managers to act on behalf of the shareholders.1  For large Western economies, 
studies typically find a positive relation between executive compensation and firm 
performance.2  However, it may be problematic to rely on empirical studies based on the US 
experience to make policy inferences in other countries.  Most nations have ownership 
structures which have dramatically higher levels of ownership concentration compared to US 
firms.3,4  In addition, shares of firms with concentrated ownership are frequently held by one 
or more families, where family shareholders often hold management positions.   
In the case of these family firms, it is argued that the primary agency conflict is no longer 
between the managers and a wide base of outside shareholders.5 In fact, the primary agency 
conflict is between the controlling shareholder and minority or outside shareholders. Thus, a 
central question is whether compensation contracts are designed to mitigate this type of 
agency conflict.  Previous studies on executive compensation have largely ignored the fact 
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that compensation for managers and directors should therefore be examined simultaneously.  
Implicitly, these prior studies assume that managers and directors undertake the same 
decision-making roles.  It is argued that the relation between pay and performance is much 
more complicated that previously assumed in the literature. Specifically, variations in 
ownership structure can lead to differences in agency conflicts. Furthermore, the roles of 
managers and directors may also vary according to the ownership structure.   
 
2. Literature review 
Ownership structure within a country is often a consequence of history and the resulting 
economic system and legal environment.6  For example, in emerging market economies, the 
presence of high ownership concentrations is shown to be a response to the lack of legal 
protection for shareholders.4  The founding family often holds a high ownership stake as a 
means of solving imperfections in corporate governance mechanisms and to provide an 
avenue for effective monitoring of managers.7  Therefore, it is common that most top 
executives of family controlled companies tend to come from the controlling family.3  Theory 
suggests that linking executive compensation to firm performance can mitigate agency 
problems by aligning managerial incentives with those of the owners.1  For Asian countries, 
previous studies demonstrate a positive relation between executive compensation and firm 
performance.8,9  However, other studies find no relation between executive pay and firm 
performance.10,11  These inconsistent results can be explained by the fact that previous studies 
did not account for the effect of family influences on the pay-performance relations.  In the 
Philippines, for example, the relation between managerial pay and performance only exists for 
firms not affiliated with a family group.12 
Like those in emerging markets in Asia, many listed companies in Thailand have a high 
concentration of family ownership.3  In addition, it is common for the top executives of 
family firms in Thailand to be family members themselves.13  As a result, many corporate 
governance mechanisms designed to monitor the top managers may be less important for 
family firms in Thailand.14  To attract outside investor, board independence and monitoring 
may also be viable solutions, especially in those cases where the founder is not actively 
running the firm.13 
 
3. Hypotheses 
It is hypothesized that ownership structure, particularly the presence of family ownership, 
determines which agency problem dominates and whether tying manager pay or board pay to 
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performance best mitigates the dominant agency problem.  Much like firms in the US, Thai 
firms with more diffuse ownership structures may be prone to owner-manager agency 
conflicts that may best be alleviated by tying managers pay to performance.  In contrast, Thai 
firms with concentrated family ownership may be more likely prone to minority-majority 
owner agency conflicts that are best alleviated by tying board pay to performance.  Significant 
minority owners, unrelated to the founding family, can have the latent ability to constrain the 
self-serving behavior of majority family shareholders.  In addition, many family firms are 
willing to submit to some level of minority shareholder monitoring in order to attract outside 
funds and to build business alliances.  Therefore, it is argued that one way to diminish the 
adverse effects of the manager-owner agency conflict, which is more likely to occur in a non-
family firm with a diffuse base of owners, is to tie manager compensation to firm 
performance.   
Hypothesis 1a.  The relation between manager pay and performance is stronger for non-
family firms than family firms. 
In contrast, a way to diminish the majority owner-minority owner agency conflict, which may 
be more likely occur in a family firm, is to tie board compensation to performance.   
Hypothesis 1b.  The relation between board pay and performance is stronger for family firms 
than non-family firms. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
The sample consists of 218 non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET).  Ownership information is gathered from the SETSMART database, which provides a 
list of the top ten shareholders for each firm.  In addition, annual reports and annual 
regulatory filings (e.g. Form 56-1) are used to trace share ownership.  Share ownership is 
categorized as family ownership for all family-controlled shares, including shareholders with 
the same surname and known familial relationships (relatives, spouses, children, etc.), even if 
the last names are different.  Descriptive statistics for firm specific variables are presented in 
Table 1.  Family ownership, defined as the number of shares owned by family members 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding, averages 36.5 percent across the sample 
indicating the high ownership concentration in Thailand.  The dependent variables in the 
regression models are director compensation and manager compensation.  Return on assets 
(ROA) is employed as the measure of firm performance.  Corporate governance variables 
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included in the analysis are the percentage of family ownership, CEO duality, CEO/founder 
dummy, Board Chair/founder dummy, board size, and board independence.  Firm-specific 
variables include firm size, growth, leverage, and risk. 
Table 1 - This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 218 public firms in Thailand.  
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD 
Family Ownership 0.37 0.40 0.00 0.91 0.26 
Board Size 11.88 11.00 3.00 29.00 4.46 
Board Independence  0.34 0.33 0.14 0.73 0.11 
Average Director Pay (mil. Baht) 0.54 0.31 0.01 6.41 0.70 
Average Manager Pay (mil. Baht) 3.16 2.30 1.20 14.34 2.58 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.06 0.05 -0.19 0.32 0.08 
Firm Size (Logarithm of Total Assets) 15.11 14.97 11.90 20.29 1.42 
Growth (3-year Asset Growth) 0.48 0.29 -0.72 4.48 0.77 
Leverage (Debt/Total Assets) 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.88 0.20 
Risk (Standard Deviation of Returns) 0.82 0.54 0.02 6.12 0.92 
 
5. Empirical results 
Table 2 reports regression results with director compensation and management compensation 
as the dependent variables.  The sample is classified into two groups based on the proportion 
of family ownership.  The results of the models demonstrate that the pay-performance relation 
differs between high family-concentrated and low family-concentrated firms.  Specifically, 
there is a positive relation between director pay and performance among high family 
ownership firms, whereas the positive relation between manager pay and performance holds 
only for low family ownership firms.  In high family ownership firms, managers appear to be 
effectively monitored by family owners or are themselves members of the family.  Therefore, 
it may not be beneficial to tie manager pay to firm performance.  However, in these high 
family ownership firms, the monitoring role of the board may become correspondingly more 
important.  This is consistent with our findings and the idea that conflicts between majority 
family owners and minority owners are more easily resolved at the board level.  In low family 
ownership firms, managers are more likely to be outside professionals and may have greater 
decision-making responsibilities.  As evidence, manager pay is found to be positively related 
to performance for low family ownership firms.  These findings suggest that directors are the 
key decision-makers in family firms, whereas managers are the key decision-makers for the 
more widely-held, low family ownership firms.  The empirical results provide support to the 
notion that in non-family firms, the overriding governance conflict is between the managers 
and a diffuse base of owners.  The results also highlight to roles of board of directors for high 
family ownership firms. 
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Table 2 - Regression Results between Executive Compensation and Firm Performance 
 Director Compensation Manager Compensation 
 Low        High          Low    High 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.191 3.699* 3.310* 0.082 
  (0.15) (3.29) (4.00) (0.12) 
Family Ownership 0.059 -0.442 0.557 0.047 
  (0.09) (-0.57) (1.35) (0.10) 
CEO Duality 0.020 -0.204 -0.313 0.156 
  (0.06) (-0.75) (-1.50) (0.97) 
Board Size -0.011 0.220 -0.340 0.049 
  (-0.04) (0.92) (-1.90) (0.35) 
Board Independence -0.337 0.077 -0.173 0.226 
  (-1.03) (0.25) (-0.81) (1.23) 
Firm Size 0.419* 0.548* 0.281* 0.426* 
  (5.82) (7.38) (6.03) (9.72) 
Growth -0.032 0.250 -0.210* 0.105 
  (-0.28) (1.56) (-2.88) (1.11) 
Leverage -0.163 -0.882 0.246 -0.436 
  (-0.31) (-1.80) (0.73) (-1.51) 
Risk 0.008 -0.054 -0.030 -0.033 
  (0.08) (-0.46) (-0.49) (-0.47) 
Intercept 5.972* 4.155* 10.904* 8.477* 
  (4.85) (3.41) (13.67) (11.75) 
Adj. R-squared 0.251 0.456 0.447 0.482 
F-statistics 5.02* 11.04* 10.72* 12.15* 
N         109          109           109           109 
* p < 0.05 
 
6. Conclusions 
The findings from this study highlight potential problems with generalizing empirical 
relations for director pay-performance or manager pay-performance.  The results show that, 
under different ownership structures, the relations observed for director pay-performance are 
in sharp contrast to the relations uncovered for manager pay-performance.  Given the 
relatively weak legal environment present in Thailand, it is not surprising to find evidence 
that the relation between pay and performance is affected by the firm’s ownership structure.  
To date, nearly all previous pay-performance studies of firms in economies around the world 
have investigated only director pay or manager pay, but not both.  In Thailand, the results also 
show that the pay-performance relations are mediate by the firms’ ownership structure.  These 
findings highlight the complex and dynamic nature of corporate governance in emerging 
markets.  The interrelation between ownership structure and other corporate governance 
mechanisms are important considerations in the study of the roles of directors and managers.  
Finally, Asian regulators should emphasize the importance of disclosing the compensation of 
both managers and directors.   
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